Iran is pursuing an aggressive policy against neighboring Azerbaijan, holding, on October 1, military exercises close to their shared border, and banning Azerbaijani military aircraft from using its airspace and flying as of October 6. Tehran justifies the escalation by claiming that Israel is carrying out activities inside Azerbaijan, a claim Azeri President Ilham Aliyev dismissed.
Iran’s Escalation against Azerbaijan
Iran took the following measures after the crisis broke out with Azerbaijan:
1. Holding military exercises near Azerbaijan’s border:
Iran’s army carried out the ‘Khyber Conquerors’, the first since the fall of the Soviet Union using artillery, armored vehicles and drones. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev criticized Iran for holding the exercise saying “Why now, and why on our border?”
Named ‘Khayber’ on purpose to refer to a battle between Muslims led by Prophet Mohammad, and the Jews living in Khaybar, Iran’s military drill holds an implicit threat to Azerbaijan which, according to Iranian claims, hosts Israeli military forces on its territory.
Referring to Azerbaijan’s military cooperation with Israel, Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei, on October 3, said that countries in the region around Iran’s northwest shouldn’t allow “foreign armies that are serving their own national interests” to interfere in their affairs or become involved in their armies. He also urged these neighboring countries to “stay independent” and “join forces.”
2. Banning Azerbaijani military aircraft from using Iranian airspace:
On October 5, Tehran announced that as of October 6 Iran’s airspace will be closed to Azerbaijan’s military aircraft.
3. Enhancing cooperation with Armenia:
Tehran, on October 4, received Armenian foreign minister Ararat Mirzoyan who met with his Iranian counterpart Hossein Amir Abdollahian. The aim of the visit appears to be to bolster the Iranian-Armenian alliance against Azerbaijan. These intentions were evidenced by statements made on October 4 by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who reiterated that Armenia will not be involved in any conspiracy against Iran.
4. Iran’s attempt to provoke Russian pressure:
Abdollahian, who visited Moscow on October 6 to meet his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov, emphasized that his country will not tolerate any change to the map of the Caucasus, and that it “expects Russia to react to probable changes to regional countries’ borders and be sensitive about the presence of the terrorists and the Israeli moves in the region.” The statement signals Iran’s attempt to take advantage of Russia’s influence on Azerbaijan to pressure Baku to prevent the Israelis from using its territory against Iran.
5. Building an alternative route with Armenia:
Tehran and Yerevan sought to find alternative overland routes to bypass Azerbaijan. A group of Iranian engineers visited Armenia on October 3 for consultations about Iran’s participation in a project to build the Aghvani-Tatev transit road in southern Armenia which will bypass the Goris-Kapan road that became under Azerbaijan’s control. The alternative road will link Iran to Russia and Europe through Armenian territory.
Tehran also seeks to enhance economic relations with Armenia. The leaders of Iran and Armenia discussed ways of accelerating the construction of a power transfer between their countries, and building a dam on the Aras River. The move comes as a response to Azerbaijan’s decision to halt part of its energy imports from Iran.
Causes of Iran’s Concerns
The following dynamics fueled Iran’s fear of Azerbaijan and prompted the Iranian military escalations against Baku.
1. Accusing Azerbaijan of hosting Israeli forces:
Iran accuses Azerbaijan of allowing Israeli military forces and intelligence agents to use its territory near the Iranian border. The accusation was clearly voiced by Abdollahian in statements he made on October 8. He stressed that Israel’s intelligence presence in Azerbaijan is not in the interest of this country. Moreover, Hussein Kanani, a former commander in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, claimed that his country was aware of the existence of Israeli bases in Azerbaijan for many years.
In statements to Iran’s state TV, Iranian officials claimed that Israeli forces stationed in Baku were responsible for carrying out attacks against Iran’s nuclear program and the assassination of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. They also claimed that the Israeli forces used drones launched from al-Qibla base south of Baku to carry out military and reconnaissance operations. They further noted that Iran downed an Israeli Hermes drone on its way to the Natanz nuclear facility, and that nuclear documents were also stolen from Iran by elements who entered through Azerbaijan’s territory.
Iran’s assessments appear to be based on the growing relations between Baku and Tel Aviv that were evidenced by Israel’s support to Azerbaijan in its war with Armenia. Israel supplied attack drones and satellite spying technology which, along with support from Turkey, contributed towards the victory Baku inflicted on Yerevan.
2. Iran’s fears of Turkey’s influence:
Iran is wary of Turkey’s growing role in the region, especially because of Ankara’s conspicuous support to Baku in its war with Armenia, as well as because of Turkey’s being a major party to post-war arrangements made through understandings between Russia and Turkey alone, as Iran was excluded although it offered mediation on several occasions.
Turkey seeks to expand its influence in the South Caucasus by strengthening its ties with Azerbaijan. The endeavor was evidenced by military exercises jointly carried out this year by Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan. The Three Brothers – 2021 and the Ataturk XI-2021 drills were held on February 9 and September 12 in Islamabad and Baku, respectively.
Before that, a joint military drill was held by Turkey and Azerbaijan from June 21-23 in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan Autonomous Region, which borders Iran, and in which Azerbaijan secured a foothold by virtue of the ceasefire agreement signed with Armenia. Although the war games were intended to send a message to Armenia, the participation of Turkish military forces near the Iranian border raised Iran’s concerns.
3. Imposing toll on Iranian trucks:
Azerbaijan imposed a road tax on Iranian trucks that use the Goris-Kapan Highway between Iran and Armenia, a critical corridor captured by Azerbaijan in its war with Armenia.
Moreover, Azerbaijani police blocked Iranian trucks from driving on the motorway and arrested a number of Iranian drivers who protested the new toll. As a result, Iranian trucks entered the Nagorno-Karabakh region without official permits from Azerbaijani authorities, which prompted Baku to summon the Iranian ambassador on August 11 to protest against the Iranian trucksters’ behavior.
4. Threats to Iranian transit roads:
An agreement was reached to build a road through Armenia to connect Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region, on the border with Iran. Bypassing Iranian territory, the new road will replace the current route between the landlocked Nakhchivan region and the main territory of Azerbaijan.
Moreover, the new route will cut the overland connection between Armenia and Iran which will lose one of the most vital transit routes to Georgia and Europe, while Turkey will gain access to the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan and wider influence in the Caucasus, a development Iran is strongly opposing.
5. Shutting down Iran’s Khamenei’s representative office:
Azerbaijan, on October 5, shut down the office and mosque of the representative of Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei in Baku, in retaliation for Iran’s closure of its air space to Azerbaijan’s military aircraft.
The Future of Bilateral Relations
The following are potential trajectories of the current crisis between Iran and Azerbaijan.
1. Limited stand-off:
Iran might carry out a limited military assault against Azerbaijan to urge it to halt cooperation with Israel and stop allowing Israelis from using Azerbaijan territory to carry out sabotage operations against Iran.
But the chances for this scenario to materialize become slimmer given, on the one hand, that Iran is not in a good position to enter a military conflict with Azerbaijan and its regional allies, Israel and Turkey in particular. Such a conflict would drain Iran’s powers.
On another hand, Iran shares a 700-kilometer border with Azerbaijan and its sizable Azeri minority, which, at 20 percent of Iran's population, is the second largest ethnicity after the majority Persian population, and live in provinces bordering Azerbaijan. If Tehran decides to seek a military solution to the crisis, the Iranian Azeris will sympathize with Azerbaijan and cause a negative impact on Iran’s territorial integrity.
2. Azerbaijani guarantees:
Through escalation, Iran seeks mainly to put pressure on Azerbaijan to stop allowing Israel to use Azeri territory to carry out attacks against Iran, especially given that Iran is unable to put an end to recurrent attacks inside its own territory. Therefore, Iran might de-escalate with Azerbaijan if Baku gives sufficient reassurances to Tehran that Azeri territory will not be used again against Iran in the future.
3. Russian mediation:
Russia acts as a guarantor of stability in the Caucasus, based especially on its good relations with both Iran and Azerbaijan. But Tehran appears to be seeking to take advantage of Russia to curb Israel’s potential role in Azerbaijan, which mainly targets Iran. This is specially so because Moscow is concerned that Turkish and Israeli roles can reduce its own influence in Central Asia.
4. Prolonged tension:
In this scenario, the situation continues unchanged where the two states are unable to resolve their differences or undo reciprocal escalation.
In conclusion, the recent tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan show that the latter’s military victory against Armenia has caused a regional ripple effect. When the balance of power tilted in favor of Azerbaijan against Armenia, the Turkish and Israeli influence rose in Central Asia at the expense of Iran.
